Scientific Realism and Naturalism

The course aims to provide an introduction to crucial issues in general philosophy of science, a presentation of its historical development, a definition of its object and method. Firstly, the course will address the question whether general philosophy of science can still be legitimately understood as a philosophical enterprise which is distinct from the philosophies of specific scientific disciplines that flourished in the last decades. Secondly, the course will deal with the debate that characterizes the field of general philosophy of science the most, namely the realism/antirealism debate. Traditional arguments for and against scientific realism and antirealism will be analysed in detail. Some recent varieties of scientific realism and antirealism will also be discussed. Thirdly, the course will focus on an issue that is deeply related to the debate about scientific realism, namely whether a metaphysical view such as scientific realism is compatible with a metaphilosophical stance such as naturalism. More precisely, two lines of reasoning that have been developed to argue that scientific realism is incompatible with naturalism will be analysed. According to the first line of reasoning, since naturalists usually commit themselves to Darwinism, they are unable to secure our knowledge. This means that naturalism implies scepticism, and so it cannot be compatible with an epistemic optimistic stance such as scientific realism. According to the second line of reasoning, since scientific realists usually rely on the no-miracle argument to support their view, they should also embrace mathematical Platonism. But such view is regarded as incompatible with a naturalist stance, so scientific realism cannot be compatible with naturalism.

PROGRAM FOR ATTENDING STUDENTS:
Cellucci, C. (2013). Rethinking Logic. Logic in Relation to Mathematics, Evolution, and Method. Dordrecht, Springer (Chapter 4: p. 55-73).
Cellucci, C. (2015). Naturalizing the Applicability of Mathematics. Paradigmi, 33(2): 25-44.
Cellucci, C. (2017). Rethinking Knowledge. The Heuristic View. Dordrecht, Springer (Chapter 6: p. 65-81).
Chakravartty, A. (2017). Scientific Realism. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL: .
Colyvan, M. (2001). The Indispensability of Mathematics. New York, Oxford University Press (Chapter 1: p. 1-19).
Khlentzos, D. (2016). Naturalism and the Question of Realism. In: Clark, K.J. (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Oxford, Blackwell, p. 150-167.
Machamer, P. (2002). A Brief Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. In: Machamer, P., Silberstein, M. (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 1-17.
Morganti, M. (2016). Naturalism and Realism in the Philosophy Science. In: Clark, K.J. (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Oxford, Blackwell, p. 75-90.
Papineau, D., (2016). Naturalism. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL: .
Plantinga, A. (2006). How Naturalism Implies Skepticism: In: Corradini, A., Galvan, S., Lowe, E.J. (eds.), Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism, London, Routledge, p. 29-44.
Psillos, S. (2012a). Anti-Nominalistic Scientific Realism: A Defence. In: Bird, A., Ellis, B., Sankey, H. (eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures. Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. New York, Routledge, p. 53-69.
Psillos, S. (2012b). What is General Philosophy of Science? Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 43(1): 93-103.
Psillos, S. (2016). Having Science in View: General Philosophy of Science and its Significance. In: Humphreys, P. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 137-160.
Stanford, K.P. (2006). Exceeding Our Grasp. Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford, Oxford University Press (Chapters 1, 2, 6: p. 3-50; p. 141-163).
Stanford, K.P. (2016). Naturalism without Scientism. In: Clark, K.J. (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Oxford, Blackwell, p. 91-108.

PROGRAM FOR NON-ATTENDING STUDENTS:
Non-attending students must add to the program:
Ladyman, J. (2002): Understanding Philosophy of Science. London, Routledge (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8: p. 129-263).